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Redefining the Issues in Fetal Experimentation·
Eugene F. Diamond, M.D.

Doctor Diamond, a member of
the department of pediatrics at
Loyola University's Stritch School
of Medicine, is also an associate
editor of Linacre Quarterly.
There has been a crisis of publi c confidence (Marriage and
Family Newsletter, January
1972, pp. 1-8) in the medical
profession generated in this
country by the performance of
vivisection-type experiments on
live aborted fetuses 1 and highly
questionable therapeutic trials involving institutionalized mentally
defective children. 2 ,3 Very few
investigators and a small number
of studies are involved. Measures
to prevent a recurrence of abuses
are appropriate, but the response
of the medical profession to attempts to establish guidelines has
been hyperbolic, and overblown,
and inconsistent with the profession's crucial responsibility to
patient advocacy.
The issue has never been
whether research would be conducted but how it would be conducted. Research is not necessarily deterred by restrictive guidelines. It is quite possible that research as a whole would be advanced if the public were reass ured that no further abuses
would be tolerated (News &
Comment 25:8,1974).
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Much of what has been indignantly defended in the medical
literature as "essential to progress" was never at issue in the debate. Responsible opponents of
inappropriate fetal experimentation have not opposed the taking
of fetal blood samples in
amounts that were not exsanguinating or a threat to circulatory function. Similarly, the aspiration of amniotic fluid specimens, the majority of which
would be done for therapeutic
indications, would not be precluded by most state laws as proposed . The proposed Illinois law
would specifically exempt procedures done to establish cellculture lines, providing that these
procedures were not, of themselves, life-threatening (HB-2211
78th General Assembly, State of
Illinois). Almost all guidelines
specifically indicate that experiments done to promote the
health or preserve the life of the
experimental subject were not to
be forbidden.
Questions of Consent
The systematic performance
of abortions in order to make
*Reprinted with permission from
Th e Journal of the American Medical
Association, July 19, 1976 , Vol. 236,
No . 3, pp. 281-283 . Copyright 1976,
American Medical Association.
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fetal donor organs available for
transplantation would not be tolerated (J Religious Ethics 2 :33,
1974). However, the occasional
use of fetal organs, such as the
thym us, for transplantation
would not be routinely opposed,
providing that the aborted infant
were dead, using the same criteria for death determination that
would be applied to an adult
donor. One need not approve of
abortion in order to allow the
disposal of the tissues of the
child who is dead as a result of
abortion. One need not approve
of murder in order to allow the
murder victim's body to be autopsied or his organs to be donated (Natl Right to Life News,
September 1974, pp. 10-11). Criteria such as those of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School 4 could be used to establish that the aborted child
was, in fact, dead before organs
were removed for transplant.
Likewise , the criteria of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act could
be applied to the use of body
parts of deceased infants, subject
to the approval of next of kin.
Whereas next of kin might
reasonably qualify to grant autopsy permission, there is serious
question as to whether the
mother who has consented to
abortion would qualify to give
permission for non beneficial research on her aborted child. If
the decision to abort is accepted
as a resolution of a conflict between the rights of the mother
and the rights of the child, then
it must be admitted that the
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mother who chooses abortion
has demonstrated her willingness
to prefer her rights to those of
the child. This would be the case
in all instances except the very
rare situation where no abortion
means death for both the mother
and fetus. Arguments that are
proposed under the rubric of the
"woman's right to her body"
usually unscientifically and erroneously define the fetus as a
part of the woman's body rather
than a resident in the woman's
body. In either event, no such
claim can be made by the woman
for control over an infant placed
outside of the woman's body by
an abortion procedure.
In hearings before the Health
Subcommittee on the subject of
fetal experimentation, Senator
Edward Kennedy suggested 5
that it would be hard to justify
to reasonable men and women
the proposition that the mother
of an aborted infant had "the interest, love, and concern for the
patient foremost in her mind
when she gives consent to experimentation on her live aborted
offspring." Parents who give
proxy consent to experimentation on their children are usually
accepted as having such affectional bonds to the child outside
of the context of abortion, but
the assumption of such loving interest is highly questionable
w hen experimentation on
aborted subjects is at issue.
This is of particular importance when the experiment proposed is non therapeutic in nature. It is, in fact, currently a
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moot issue to be decided by the
courts. (Nielson vs Regents of
the University of California, et
al) as to whether any parents
may ever give consent to nonbeneficial research on a child. The
aforementioned court decision
may resolve the issue, but in the
meanwhile, we may rely on a tradition traceable to English common law that a parent may not
consent to anything that injures
his child.6 This tradition is the
basis for all child-abuse laws . No
one may sign a permit for an illegal act on another person, even
if that person is his own "minor
dependent child . A parent may
require his own child's services
but may not sell his child into involuntary servitude to another
outside the family. The decision
as to what constitutes legal
proxy consent to nontherapeutic
experimentation is likely to remain with the courts irrespective
of any medical body's decision.
Questions of Viability
The World Health Organization defines a live birth as the delivery of a neonate with a heartbeat, a pulsating cord, a muscular
movement, or a respiratory effort. A crucial difference between the opposing camps in the
fetal experimentation debate revolves around the right to protection of the live-born product of
an induced abortion. One camp
concentrates on the fact that the
infant is, in fact, now alive. The
other camp concentrates on the
fact that he is nonviable by prognosis. Opposition to non therapeutic experimentation on such
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an infant is based on the principle that no experiment can be
justified merely on the basis of
the fact that the patien t suffers
from a uniformly fatal disease
with a short life expectancy. This
rule would have as much validity
if the abortion had been spontaneous rather than induced.
It would be preferable to separate the issues of fetal experimentation from the emotionally
charged issue of abortion. The
Supreme Court decision of Jan.
22 , 1973, while it has called into
question the rights of the previable fetus in utero, has not
affected the rights of any liveborn infant once he is outside
the womb. Some investigators,
however, seem to have inferred
otherwise and have specifically
referred to the aforesaid abortion
decision as a justification for experimentation. The Society for
Developmental Biology, for example, has stated in a unanimously approved resolution that
it "supports the continued use of
human tissues at all states of development, embryonic and fetal,
within the framework of the Doe
vs. Bolton ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court" (Pediatric News,
September 1975 , p . 5). John
Opitz, MD, at the Annual National Foundation Birth Defects
Conference, is quoted as follows:
"The Supreme Court decision on
abortion defined the right of
every citizen to make an informed decision on abortion .
This right must not be abridged
by restrictions on fetal research"
(Pediatric News, September
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1974, p. 7). It would seem that
it is the proabortionists, not the
anti-abortionists, who have confused the issues of abortion and
experimentation. A careful reading of Roe us Wade and Doe us
Bolton would support the notion
that its principles cease to apply
once the mother is separated
from her offspring. The Supreme
Court was reluctant to confer
"personhood" prior to birth, but
it is difficult to see how it could
avoid conferring personhood on
a living, albeit previable, infant.
Surely the infant cannot be construed as a part of the mother,
with its rights in conflict with
hers, if the mother is in a recovery room and the infant is in an
incubator in the nursery.
Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Value
As in the abortion debate,
there has been an unfortunate
attempt to inject religious issues
into the debate by absurd slogans
such as "Know-Nothingism"
(Hospital Practice 9:11, 1974) or
dark references to the Galileo
trial or the Scopes case.7 The
medical profession, in consigning
the protesters to the peculiar
isolation of a lunatic fringe, does
so at the peril of its own political
credibility. The entire spectrum
of the society is very literally involved in this debate. The original protests against the Willowbrook experiments originated on
one end of the political spectrum
from the Student Health Organization at Mount Sinai (Contraindications 2:1-4, 1974) and the
original protests against fetal experimentation orginated from a
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small band of high -school protesters from a convent school in
Maryland (Pediatric News, May
1973, p. 1) on the other end of
the spectrum. The issues are nonsectarian, but they do contrast
two philosophical positions. One
position would assert a transcendental view of human life at all
stages of life's continuum, embryonic, fetal, child, adult. Life
at all stages, in this view, has an
intrinsic and unquantifiable
value. This value transcends the
real or alleged values of experimentation and research. If a
human being is deformed, dying
of a fatal disease, or previable,
the ontological goodness of his
being is still intact.
The other position would consign to human beings values that
are extrinsic . Each human life is
not an end in and of itself, but
rather a means to another end,
which is the good society. Extrinsic value is not a per se condition of life, and some are said to
lack it.8 From the totalitarian
view that the individual exists for
the society, one can conclude
that experiments can be performed on a member of this generation in order to assist members of future generations. A
small injustice to this previable
infant may result in great benefits to mankind. An experiment
performed on a pregnant woman
scheduled for abortion may help
a "wanted" child to have a better
chance of survival. Lives which
grossly lack "quality" (e .g.,
trisomy 21) should be terminated early for their own and society's good. 9
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As Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits 10 has pointed out, however,
if one life is construed as having
infinite value, then one life is as
valuable as many lives, and any
small fraction of a life has infinite value because any fraction
of infinity is still infinite.
Fetus ex Utero vs Infant
How can these two conflicting
views be reconciled in order to
establish guidelines acceptable to
both philosophies? One essential
first step is to treat the live-born
previable child delivered by abortion the same as any other subject for human experimentation.
The proposed policy of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare l l on Protection of
Human Subjects displays some
reluctance to do this.
For example, the commission
lists four principles that it describes as "among the general
principles for research judged to
be valid and binding." The second of these four principles (referred to as the "principle of
equality") is as follows: "To provide for fair treatment by avoiding discrimination between classes or among members of the
same class." Commenting on this
principle of equality, the commission anticipates that "differences of interpretation will arise
over the application of the basic
principles of equality and the determination of minimal risk."
The report explains, "Some
members held that no procedures
should be applied to a fetus to be
aborted that would not be applied to a fetus going to term ."
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This proposal was rejected, however, and the protection afforded
the not-to-be-aborted fetus in
recommendation 4 is effectively
removed from the fetus in anticipation of abortion in recommendation 5 by the proviso that a
"national ethical review body"
might allow nontherapeutic experiments of greater-than-minimal risk to the fetus to be
aborted. Louisell,2 in his minority report, recommends that this
provision be eliminated in favor
of a declaration that "no research should be permitted on a
fetus to be aborted that could
not be permitted on one to go to
term."
Likewise, in its recommendation 6, the commission provides
for the possibility that, with maternal approval and lack of paternal objection, certain infants up
to five months gestational age
might be submitted to non therapeutic research not possible on
other live human beings, providing again that a "national ethical
review body" approves. Interestingly, such a subject for experimentation is described as a "nonviable fetus ex-utero." Traditionally, medicine, law, and the society in general have used the
term "human infant" to describe
a live birth regardless of its
degree of prematurity. In its recommendation 7, the commission
itself refers to the "possible
viable infant" rather than the
"possible viable fetus ex-utero"
and then proceeds to accord to
this "infant" protections not accorded to the class described as
Linacre Quarterly

"fetuses ex-utero" by the elimination of the "review body" escape clause. Since "fetus" is a
word used to describe a stage of
intrauterine life, "fetus ex-utero"
is probably a contradiciton in
terms that, one may reasonably
suspect, was chosen to reflect an
unwillingness to humanize the
previable infant (particularly
when it was born as a result of
induced abortion). The sophisticated classification used by the
commission is very helpful in
structuring the discussion. It
must not be accepted as a means
for defining some human beings
out of existence, however, nor a
means to divert our attention
from what our experiment proposes to do and onto the nature
of the experimental subject.
Once the "non-viable fetus
ex-utero" is treated as a small human being while alive, many of
the difficulties are reconciled.
Guidelines based on this presumption can be developed, or
the traditional guidelines of the
Declaration of Helsinki or the
Nuremberg Code can be applied
to the model of research on the
so-called "abortus." Article III-1
of the Declaration of Helsinki
states : "In the purely scientific
application of clinical research
carried out on a human being, it
is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the life
and health of that person on
whom clinical research is being
carried out." This article would
clearly preclude such experiments as those in which live-born
fetuses were decapitated in order
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that their heads could be perfused to study carbohydrate metabolism .1 Articles 1-3, 11I-3b,
and III-4b would also be germane
to the types of newborn experiments that have brought criticism (Marriage and Family Newsletter, January 1972, pp. 1-8).
Logical Inconsistencies
There are those who suggest
that there is no way to understand the problems unique to
prenatal and neonatal life without using experimental subjects
during these particular stages.
The same could be said of diseases peculiar to the geriatric age
group or adolescence or any
other age-specific disease process.
This may not be used as a justification for suspending the rules
on nontherapeutic experimentation or for settling down agespecific rules for obtaining consent (Medical World News, October 1973, pp. 32-36). Likewise,
the limitations in translating animal data to human application
are equally applicable to research
done on human beings at all ages.
In point of fact, progeny studies
done on animal species have been
successful in many instances in
predicting adverse human effects
of drugs. In the case of thalidomide, research done on almost every species of animal has
demonstrated the production of
limb-bud anomalies directly comparable to those produced in human subjects (Medical Tribune
72:3,1966).
If the patterns of funding by
the National Institutes of Health
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are to be used as an indication,
the performance of nontherapeutic experimentation on
fetuses in utero and live-born
aborted infants make up only a
fractional part of the total of
perinatal research. The unethical
use of aborted experimental subjects is attributable to an infinitesimal percentage of researchers
in this field. The establishment
of reasonable controls over fetal
experimentation need not pose a
threat either to medical progress
or to the responsible investigator.
Nonproprietary Name
and Trademark of Drug
Thalidomide - Kevadon .
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Are You Moving?
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a different address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with
your address will be most helpful.
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